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Abstract
The political race for the 2016 United States President brimmed with conflict over an array of
issues, notably Latino immigration from Mexico and Latin America to the U.S. The rhetoric of
then Presidential Candidate Donald Trump centered around the idea that Mexico was not sending
its finest immigrants; that, in place, they were sending rapists and criminals. This rhetoric was
heard loud and clear and has since affected various U.S. policies and programs that actively
exclude Latino immigrants. Using census data from 2015, rates of immigration and rates of
violent crime were compared against 2016 election results, all at the county-level. The goal was
to assess whether county-level rates of violent crime or the county-level rates of Latino
immigrants were correlated with how these communities ultimately voted in the 2016 election.
Whereas existing literature reveals overall immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than U.S.
born citizens, this research show that counties with higher rates of immigration are more likely to
vote Democrat, net other key predictors, regardless of crime rate; counties with lower rates of
immigration are more likely to vote Republican, regardless of crime rate and net other key
predictors.
Keywords: Latino immigration, elections, crime, diversity, community, 2016, education
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Introduction
The immigration of Latinos to the United States has long been considered a threat to the
dominant culture, language, values, and safety (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes, 2018; Branton et al.,
2011). A narrative beginning in the early 1900s and continuing to the present, Latinos were
framed as ‘foreigners’ and ‘aliens’ - ‘invading’, ‘flooding’, and ‘infecting’ the country. Often
times referred to as ‘reconquistas’ by white America, it is feared Latinos will ‘reconquer’ the
land lost during the Mexican-American war (Guardino, 1963; Chavez, 2020; Fernández, 2010;
Lopez, 2013). This story, repeated over 100 years, has deeply impacted public perceptions and
prejudices of Latinos overall.
Targeted as ‘unwilling’ to assimilate and ‘undeserving’ of opportunity, Latino
immigrants are often considered a burden to the state and public education system. Education
classes aimed at ‘assimilation’ to the dominant English language, such as ESL, are viewed with
distrust. Gang, alcohol, and drug-related offenses committed by immigrants are weaponized
politically and highlighted in the news media. Even though literature contradict this, the biggest
perceived threat the narrative tells is that linking immigration to crime.
Donald Trump’s 2016 U.S. election bid was arguably the first in which immigration,
specifically Latino immigration, was the target of a presidential campaign. Trump’s rhetoric
decrying Latinos as rapists, bad people, and invaders was widely echoed from multiple
platforms, including by other politicians and the news media. The focal point of rallies became
‘build the wall’ [between Mexico and the U.S.] and the response to the ‘immigrant problem’ was
‘shoot them’ (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes, 2018). With this rhetoric at the heart of the campaign,
the question remains: to what extent did the Latino threat narrative affect the 2016 U.S.
presidential election results at the county level and across all incorporated census places? Using
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federal 2015 U.S. census data, we test whether rates of Latino immigration and rates of crime
had an effect on political party vote, net other key predictors of poverty (food insecurity, femaleheaded households, low employment, and low education). More openly, through the use of
hierarchical multiple regression models, we explore whether local crime rate or local
immigration rate were actually associated with how communities ultimately voted.
Literature Review
The Contact Hypothesis and Latino Threat Narrative
Coined contemporarily in 1945 by Gordon Allport, the Contact Hypothesis theorizes that
between-group contact not only tends to result in less inter-group animosity, it can also reduce
intergroup prejudice and discrimination (Allport et al., 1954; McKeown and Dixon, 2016;
Gaertner et al., 1996). Existing research show this increased and extended contact can lead to
greater tolerance, reduce inter-group anxieties, and ultimately increase group salience and
common goals (Dovidio et al., 2003; Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Turner et al, 2008). The closer
and more situated the contact, the more accurate representation of other cultures and races
emerge, oftentimes far removed from the stereotypes surrounding them (Ellison et al., 2011). In
other words, communities that are more heterogenous in their ethnic will be more tolerant of
unlike others, forming “we” mentalities and communities as opposed to “us” and “them”
frameworks.
Alternatively, the absence diversity in homogenous communities can lead to increased
fear, anxiety, and decreased tolerance of unlike others. Racial prejudices are less likely to
dimmish, as beliefs surrounding minority culture and language form without the opportunity for
significant intergroup contact to occur, at any level (Ellison et al. 2011; Mancini et al., 2015).
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Arising from homogenously situated and historically dominant White America, the
Latino Threat Narrative targets both Latinos and Latino immigrants as unwilling to assimilate to
dominant U.S. culture, politics, and language, instead forming emerging communities and social
networks from the East coast to the West. This narrative depicts Latino immigrants as
undeserving, illegal, burdensome, and criminal aliens (Chavez, 2020; Cervantes et al., 2018;
Branton et al., 2011). The perceived abandonment of white American values and the white
American dream, along with rising rates of Latino immigration to the U.S. lead to fear that
American culture and identity were in danger (Chavez, 2020). Emerging in the 1920s, public
discourse framed Mexican and Latino immigrants as a criminal threat; in the 1970s, they became
‘illegal aliens’, likened to an ‘invasion’ of U.S. soil (Chavez, 2020).
Emerging from the Latino threat narrative include misconceptions that are substantial in
consequence. Taking this narrative at face value, Latino immigrant populations are largely
overestimated by the public. They are oftentimes blamed for criminal violence, particularly
including gang violence and drug trafficking, loss or lack of employment, and seen as
burdensome to social welfare programs, the public education system, and healthcare systems in
the U.S. (Chomsky, 2007; Tirman, 2015; Leo, 2020; Harris and Gruenewald, 2012).
Drastically overestimating the number of immigrants in the U.S., research by Pew
Research Center (2019) shows only 76% of respondents estimated immigrant counts to be
between two and three times the actual figure of 12%. A majority of respondents, over 50%, also
believed Latino immigrants held undocumented status (Pew Research Center, 2019).
Drug and alcohol related incidents that did involve Latino immigrants were pushed into
the spotlight, reiterating the myth of the dangerous and violent ‘criminal immigrant’. The focus
on arrests and deportation of members from street gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha, commonly
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known as MS-13, was a focal point in support of anti-immigration policies and stoked public fear
and distrust. Crimes that are committed by Latino immigrants are headlined by politicians and
news media, increasing fear and singling out an already disadvantaged and targeted community
(Harris and Gruenewald, 2012). This framing has aided in negative views of Latino immigrants.
In a recent Pew Research Center (2019) study, 33% of respondents expressed the belief Latino
immigrants significantly increase crime (Pew Research Center, 2019).
The narrative that immigration increases crime while decreasing job opportunities for
citizens and harming the taxpayer is real (Davies and Fagan, 2012; McCan and Boateng, 2020).
In a recent study by Pew Research Center (2019), 75% of respondents believed either themselves
or someone they knew had lost a job to an immigrants, citing immigrants as a burden to the U.S.,
supporting immigration decreases (61%), and viewing immigration as a major problem for the
country. Interchangeable with economic anxiety and instability is the perception of wage
suppression. Fear of economic instability leads to large numbers of Latino immigrants being
viewed as a critical, very serious issue (Gallup, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2019). Job loss and
economic anxieties aid in overestimating the number of immigrants, supporting anti-immigration
rhetoric and political action.
The narrative that immigrants are a burden on public resources such as medical care,
SNAP for food insecure families, and public education system is rampant. According to Pew
Research Center (2019), 37% of Americans believe Latino immigrants are likely to end up on
welfare. An additional misperception is that Latino immigrants are a burden on the public
education system. U.S.-born children and thus American citizens of immigrants were labeled
‘anchor babies’, to portray how immigrant parents ‘used’ the birth of their child(ren) to stay
locked to U.S. soil, avoiding deportation (Tirman, 2015; Kim et al., 2018; Foster, 2017) At the
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academic level, the use of ESL (English as a Second Language) classes for students in various
stages of learning the English language are often viewed with fear. This inclusion in education is
often perceived as an ‘unwillingness’ to learn the language and as a ‘personal choice’ to be
segregated with like ‘un-assimilating’ others (Carter, 2014).
The Immigrant-Crime Paradox
Prior research on the intersection of immigration and crime present a paradoxical position to
common social and political discourse – either Latino immigration has no effect, a negative
effect, or a weak association with crime (Fagan and Davies, 2012; Green, 2016; Leiva and Ponce
Olivia, 2020; McCann and Boateng, 2020). Literature shows immigrants overall are not only less
often incarcerated in the U.S. than born natives, they are also less likely to commit crimes
(Cervantes et al., 2018). Existing literature correlates rates of violent crimes with rates of poverty
and disadvantage. Higher rates of violent crime are also observed in areas where there are high
rates disadvantage. Significantly excluded from most of the social safety net in the United States,
oftentimes, Latino immigrants reside in places with existing high rates of economic
disadvantage.
Because most immigrants, including Latino immigrants, typically migrate to new
locations without established social networks, they are more likely to live in places where high
rates of disadvantage are present. Lumped together over mutual poverty, immigrants share a
disproportionate amount of social demographics as groups that already contribute considerably
to crime (Davies and Fagan, 2012). Oftentimes, this includes living in poverty in the same highrisk, disadvantaged neighborhoods, working similar low-income jobs, and having limited skills
for upward social mobility (Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez, 2019). Economic opportunities
afforded to citizens are seldom available to immigrant groups, making the move up and out of
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poverty difficult. Structural barriers faced by Latino immigrants include limited proficiency in
English, fear of deportation, uncertain or unsteady employment, and low levels of education.
Excluded from most government social safety net programs, immigrants face social isolation,
along with discrimination and prejudice (Munger et al., 2014).
Ironically, immigrants oftentimes become the victims of a crime and are at greater risk of
victimization, such as hate crimes and sex crimes, all while facing social isolation due to
language barriers (Davies and Fagan, 2012; Comino et al., 2020).
The Current Study: Anti-immigration as the Focus of the 2016 Presidential Election
Anti-immigration rhetoric continues to perpetuate the inaccurate narrative associating crime with
immigration. Uniquely, the 2016 presidential election was arguably the first presidential election
that actively targeted Latino immigrants, specifically. Referring to Latino immigrants during
campaign speeches as “these people” and “bad hombres”, Donald Trump supporting rallied
campaign cries of “shoot them”. Latino immigrants fleeing conflict and lawfully seeking asylum
at the U.S.-Mexico border were labeled as an “invasion”. In response to the perceived immigrant
invasion, “build the wall” became a chant at most campaign rallies and public speeches, insisting
Mexico would be responsible for the cost of its erection (Washington Post, 2015; Chouhy and
Madero-Hernandez; Winders, 2016; 2019; Phillips, 2017; Ross, 2016). Post-colonialized
struggling nations became “shit-hole countries”, from which immigration was not considered
economically advantageous to the United States (Washington Post, 2018; Blake, 2018; Laguerre,
2018).
Despite prior research and data that contradict this narrative, Latino immigrants
continued to be associated and further blamed for rates of violent crimes, including rape.
Declaring a state of emergency in 2019 to control ‘the growing threat at the border’, the Trump
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administration secured $3.8 billion in Pentagon funding for a border wall between the United
States and Mexico. Not only was the Latino threat narrative arguably the focus of this entire
campaign, it was also expressed in policy.
In 2017, the Trump administration announced its plan to terminate DACA (Deffered
Action for Childhood Arrivals), which granted certain protections and opportunities to those
brought to the U.S. as children. The termination of DACA aimed to stripped recipients of certain
employment rights and protection from deportation (Hainmueller et al., 2017).
In addition, the introduction of the Zero Tolerance Policy in 2018, Donald Trump’s
administration paved the way for parent-child separations for the most vulnerable Latino
immigrants. All of those seeking asylum and all undocumented immigrants were referred to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to be prosecuted. All children under the age of 18 were handed over
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human services, resulting in over 4,300 separations with
900 still waiting to be reunited as of 2021. (SPLC, 2020).
Donald Trump’s infamous 2016 campaign speech summarizes the heightened immigrantcrime narrative surrounding this election in particular:
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
bringing those problems… They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people ... But I speak to border guards and they tell
us what we’re getting ... They’re sending us not the right people” (Trump, 2016 cited in
Chouhy and Madero-Hernandez, 2019).
This repeated misleading narrative framing immigration as a determinant in predicting rates of
violent crime was used to mobilize Republican voters during the 2016 presidential election,
exacerbating widespread misperceptions and moral panic.
On a humanistic level, this research is not just a Master’s Thesis - it is personal for me
and important to me. Growing up in the San Bernardino Valleys of Southern California, my peer
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groups, social groups, neighbors, and educators were primarily Latino. The proximity of my
hometown to the Mexican border at Tijuana is a grand total of 211 miles. I married into a Latino
family, I have Afro-Latina daughters, and I speak Español. The Latino-criminal narrative
exploded exponentially during Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign for president, targeting some of
those dearest to my heart, encouraging discrimination, verbal assault, and even physical violence.
It is important to me to be able to explore, through the use of data, research, and theory, how
deep this narrative resonates with the public – if this narrative did in fact affect the way the
majority of the United States voted in the 2016 presidential election.
Methods
Based on President Donald Trump’s 2016 speech assessing the characteristics of Latino
immigrants, data were drawn from two sources. The first is 2015 data from the United States
Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), which contains key poverty variables
used in conducting this research. The second is 2016 county-level election data which contain
voting tallies for both parties. These databases were merged using FIPS codes to create a single
cohesive dataset for analysis.
U.S. Census data were used to analyze whether county-level rates of Latino immigration
or county-level rates of violent crime were significant in predicting county-level voting patterns
net other predictors such as poverty pctpopnohs and pctpopunem, and racial diversity, entropy2.
All analyses were conducted solely on the county-level. There were no missing cases in these
datasets. Tolerance and VIF values in Table 4 indicate no issues of collinearity.
Units of Analysis
The units of analysis for this research are incorporated census places, representing populated
areas that are (1) named, (2) recognized locally, and (3) not part of any existing place. These
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places may or may not have powers, functions, and legally assigned limits. Although census
places as units of analyses vary in size, crime rate, and in both demographic and social make-up,
census places uniquely contribute to discourse surrounding immigration. Using census places to
explore immigrant communities at the local, state, and national or regional level allows
invaluable information regarding mobility, immigrant group sizes by region, rates of serious
crimes, and affords for substantial statistical analyses.
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables for this research include percent of Latin American immigrants
(pctfbla), diversity index (entropy2), violence index (violence_rate), percent of population
unemployed over age 16 (pctpopunem), and percent of population without a high school degree
(pctpopnohs) for each census place. Violence rate is an index containing multiple highly
correlated types of violent crimes including counts for assault, robbery, rape, and homicide for
each census place. Diversity is an index containing measures of ‘race’ including White, Black,
Hispanic, and Asian.
Exploring the rates of violent crime at the level of the census place accounts for a
majority of potential violent crime types addressed in the literature review section of this paper,
including rape. The percentage of Latin American immigrants allows us to examine the statistical
significance of Latino immigrant presence at the county level and its potential relationship to
2016 Republican voting patterns. As described below, the variable entropy2 will control for
racial diversity.
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Additional Control Variables
The first control variable entropy2 is an index measuring diversity and includes White, Black,
Hispanic, and Asian where higher scores equate to racial heterogeneity and lower scores equate
to more racial homogeneity.
The second set of control variables, pctpopnohs and pctpopunem, measure the percent of
the county-level population without a high school degree and the percent of the county-level
population unemployed, respectively.
Analytic Technique
The purpose of this research is to explore the potential relationship between immigration, crime,
and GOP voting patterns during the 2016 presidential election, controlling for predictors of
poverty and racial heterogeneity. This analysis is three-fold. First, descriptive statistics are
provided for each variable, including mean and standard deviation.
Second, simple bivariate correlations are provided across all variables used in the model,
allowing exploration of the unique relationship between immigration and crime both before and
after accounting for differences in predictors of poverty. These simple bivariate correlations
afford for the direct exploration into the relationship between immigration and crime at the
county-level in the United States. The goal in doing this is to speak in simpler terms regarding
the relationship between the two, and more importantly, independent of any stakeholder
discourse occurring external to empirical research.
Third, results from a series of hierarchical regression models are presented, predicting
county-level GOP votes from the 2016 election, net other predictors of poverty such as the
percent of the county without a high school degree and percent unemployment. This research
began in January 2021 and was completed by the end of April 2021.
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Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics have been provided for all independent and dependent variables in Table 1.
The first column identifies the variable, while the next two columns present the corresponding
means and standard deviations (n = 2959). We note several findings.
First, the average county-level percent of Latino immigrants (M=47.58, SD=26.99), and
average county-level rates of violent crime (M=1347.82, SD=996.32) vary greatly by census
location. Second, overall average diversity, including White, Black, Hispanic, and Asian, ranges
from approximately 17% to 56% (M=.38, SD=.20). The percent of the population with low
education ranges from approximately 11% to 21%, which parallels the 2015 national average
(M=14.51, SD=1.75); (Ryan et. al, 2015). Finally, unemployment rates, on average, are
relatively low (M=4.51, SD=1.71), again, consistent with the 2015 national average (Kang and
Williamson, 2016).
Bivariate Associations
We find negative weak-to-moderate associations between percent GOP vote and the predictors
violence rate, diversity, and percent unemployment (r ranges from -.205 to -.473, p<.001). Next,
regrading immigration, we find a weak positive relationship between Latino immigration and
rates of violent crime (r= .061, p<.001).
Altogether, before controlling for any key predictors of communities into which Latino
immigrants settle, census places with higher percentages of Latino immigrants tend to have
higher rates of GOP votes, while census places with higher rates of diversity and violent crime
tend to have lower rates of GOP votes. This finding is important as the Latino Threat Narrative
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and supporting rhetoric by Donald Trump in his infamous 2016 speech focus on the criminal
menace posed by immigrating Latinos.
Third, the county-level percent of Latino immigrants is positively correlated with all other
predictors from weak-to-moderate, including diversity (r=.416, p<.001), low education (r=.478,
p<.001), and unemployment (r=.042, p<.001). Violence rate has consistent weak-to-moderate
positive correlations with diversity, low education, and unemployment (r ranges from r=.131 to
.338, p<.001).
Fourth, as previously mentioned, the additional control predictors low education, rate of
Latino immigration, unemployment, and diversity all have positive weak-to-moderate
correlations. Diversity has a positive and moderate correlation with low education (r=.323,
p<001), unemployment (r=.348, p<.001), and Latino immigration (r=.416, p<.001). Low
education has a positive weak-to-moderate correlation between the percent GOP votes (r=.127,
p<.001), Latino immigration (r=.478, p<.001), violence rate (r=.131, p<.001), low education
(r=.323, p<.001), and unemployment (r=.316, p<.001). Finally, unemployment has a positive
weak-to-moderate correlation between Latino immigration, violence rate, diversity, low
education, and unemployment (r ranges from .042 to .348, p<.001).
Multivariate Models
We conclude our primary analysis with a series of three hierarchical linear regression models
displayed in Table 3. For each additional predictor set, we construct a new model: one containing
the total percentage Latino immigrants and rate of violent crime to predict the percent of countylevel GOP votes (Model 1), a model that includes rate of Latino immigration, rate of violent
crime and diversity index (Model 2), and a model containing rate of Latino immigration, rate of
violent crime, diversity index, along with the additional set of control variables, unemployment
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and low education (Model 3). Across all of these models, our interest is in (a) the direction and
statistical significance of the relationship between 2016 GOP votes and percentage of Latino
immigrants, coinciding with the Threat Narrative, as well as (b) whether there are any
differences in 2016 GOP voting patterns net other key predictors.
Table 3 provides the model summary for all three of our hierarchical regression models.
Model 1 regression indicate the predictors violence rate and Latino immigration explain
approximately 6.3% of the variance in 2016 county-level GOP votes (adjusted R2 =.063,
F(2,2956)=100.451, p<.001). Retaining violence rate and Latino immigration, Model 2 contains
the additional control variable diversity and increases the variance explained in 2016 countylevel GOP votes to 35.6% (adjusted R2=.356, F=(1, 2955)=1345.602, p<.001). The final model,
Model 3, contains violence rate, Latino immigration, diversity, with the additional control
variables unemployment and low education. The third and final model explains approximately
42.5% of variance in 2016 county-level GOP votes (adjusted R2=.425, F=(177.21), p<.001).
Table 4 provides the regression coefficients and significance for each model. For Model
1, violence rate (β =-.214, p<.001) does a better job at explaining 2016 county-level GOP votes
than Latino immigration (β=.147, p<.001). Explaining 6.3% of variance in 2016 county-level
GOP votes, a one unit increase in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds with
a .001 increase in percent of 2016 county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in countylevel violence rate corresponds with a 3.302E-5 decrease in 2016 county-level GOP votes. The
regression equation for Model 1 is as follows:
ŷ = .635x +.001 pctfbla – 3.302E-5 violence_rate
For Model 2, the addition of the control variable diversity renders violence rate statistically
insignificant in predicting 2016 county-level GOP votes (β=-.015, p=.341). Diversity now
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explains the most variance (β=-.634, p<.001), followed by county-level percent of Latino
immigrants (β =.398, p<.001). Explaining 35.6% of variance in GOP votes, a one unit increase
in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds with a .002 increase in county-level
GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level violence rate corresponds with a -2.313E-5 unit
decrease in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level diversity corresponds
with a -.476 decrease in county-level GOP votes. The regression equation for Model 2 is as
follows:
ŷ = .705x +.002 pctfbla – 2.313E-6 violence rate -.476 entropy2
For Model 3, the addition of the control variables low education and unemployment sees
violence rate to be, once again, statistically insignificant in predicting 2016 county-level GOP
votes (β=.1.776E-6, p=.447). Again, diversity explains the most variance (β=-.590, p<.001),
followed by education (β =.265, p<.001), unemployment (β=-.234, p<.001), and Latino
immigration (β=.262, p<.001). Model 3 explains approximately 42.5% of variance in 2016
GOP votes, where a 1 unit increase in percent of county-level Latino immigrants corresponds
with a .001 increase in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level percent
diversity corresponds with a -.590 decrease in percent of county-level GOP votes. A one unit
increase in percent without a high school diploma (low education) corresponds with a .006
unit increase in county-level GOP votes. A one unit increase in county-level unemployment
corresponds with a .021 unit decrease in county-level GOP votes. The regression equation for
Model 3 is as follows:
ŷ = .726x +.001 pctfbla + 1.776E-6 violence_rate - .443 entropy2 +.006 education - .021
unemployment
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As revealed by Models 2 and 3, not only do places with higher percentages of Latino
immigration tend to have lower levels of GOP votes, these locations also render rates of violent
crime insignificant in predicting the occurrence of GOP votes. Furthermore, our models reveal
that overall diversity (entropy2) conditions the relationship with GOP votes. Essentially, countylevel GOP votes, on average, were more likely to occur in places with not only higher rates of
Latino immigrants, but in places with higher rates of low education. Inversely, county-level
Democrat votes, on average, were more likely to occur in counties with higher rates of overall
diversity, and higher rates of education (high school diploma attainment).
Discussion and Conclusion
Current literature documents the settling of Latino immigrants in U.S. communities and the
relevant patterns that emerge, such as crime reduction, positive community building, and social
interaction. Yet, an important gap remained. Hence, the focus of this research has been to
examine to what extent the overall county-level presence of Latino immigrants and overall
county-level rates of violent crime were significant in predicting GOP votes. In doing so, this
research addressed what has become common rhetoric among policy makers and the public in
general: the idea that Latino immigration is not only disadvantageous to the U.S. as a country,
but poses a real threat to citizens’ safety and security.
From our final analysis (Model 3) of near three-thousand census places across the United
States, several key findings emerge. First, 2016 GOP votes were positively associated with
county-level rates of Latino immigration, and county-level rates of low education. This suggests
U.S. census places with higher rates of Latino immigration tended to vote GOP. In summary
GOP votes were affected by county-level rates of low education and Latino immigration in our
final model (Model 3), but not by county-level rates of violent crime, which becomes statistically
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insignificant in Models 2 and 3, when controlling for other key predictors. It is important to note
that low education, operationalized by the data as the percent of the county-level population age
25 and older without a high school diploma, is positively associated with 2016 county-level GOP
votes.
Second, we find 2016 county-level GOP votes are negatively associated with diversity
and rates of violent crime. For both Models 2 and 3, rates of violent crime becomes statistically
insignificant when controlling for other predictors. Here we see 2016 county-level GOP votes
were largely, on average, situated in homogenously saturated census locations with low rates of
diversity. Furthermore, these census location also happen to be places with low overall
education, identified by the county-level percent of the population age 25 and older without a
high school diploma.
Inversely, greater diversity in county-level populations was positively associated with
voting democrat, as seen in Models 2 and 3. Overall, diversity explained the most amount of
variation in 2016 county-level GOP votes. In both of Models 2 and 3, diversity (entropy2) had
the largest Beta weights (-.634 and -.590, respectively). Additionally, census locations with more
educated populations, those having at least a high school diploma, along with census places with
higher rates of unemployment, were also more likely to vote democrat.
Findings align closely with existing literature and support the supposition of the contact
hypothesis, while rejecting the Latino Threat Narrative. The data from this research shows
increased contact with unlike others, increased diversity, can lead to reduced fear, anxiety,
prejudice, and discrimination, and thus, reduced likelihood of 2016 county-level GOP votes. As
mentioned previously, this contact oftentimes begins at the micro level through community
social interaction. Increased interaction with those unlike oneself typically results in more
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tolerance, and perhaps, even tentative acceptance, of differences in areas such as language,
culture, and ethnic origin.
Findings reject the national discourse stimulated by Donald Trump promoting the
narrative that Latino immigrants are dangerously violent criminals. The immigrant-crime
paradox and supporting research in itself rejects the Latino Threat Narrative. In this rejection,
support gathers for existing research for the immigrant-crime paradox. County-level GOP votes
were predicted to occur more in places with less crime, again, rejecting narrative that Latino
immigrants are dangerous and violently criminal. However, the presence of Latino immigrants,
regardless of rates of violent crime, led to increased votes for Donald Trump. Although discourse
surrounding the Latino Threat Narrative is factually and statistically inaccurate, data shows it
continued to drive county-level GOP votes in the 2016 presidential election.
This research has the potential to have implications in various fields of the social sciences
and public policy. Possible impacts on the fields of social science include accurate framing of
historical narratives and increased education and promotion of diversity at both the micro and
macro level. The acknowledgement from both major political parties in the U.S. of the immense
power and effect of political rhetoric could also play a significant role in shifting to a more
accurate narrative surrounding Latino immigration.
This study answers the initial research question of how county-level rates of Latino
immigration and county-level rates of violent crime affected 2016 presidential voting patterns.
We found rates of violent crime to be either negatively associated, or statistically insignificant in
predicting county-level GOP votes. Latino immigration was a significant factor across all models
presented, even when controlling for other key predictors such as diversity, education, and
unemployment. We conclude the that the presence of Latino immigrants, along with rates of low
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educational attainment and homogenous social environments, not rates of violence crime, were
actually associated with how these communities voted.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Consistent with prior research, our bivariate results clearly and in a simplistic fashion indicate
that census places with larger relative Latino immigrant populations, and larger diversity overall,
tend to have lower rates of GOP votes. Yet, this research has several key limitations, including
future voting patterns, geographic location, race, and additional predictors of poverty. Future
research might take into account region of the country where there are more racially homogenous
census places, such as the U.S. South, or more ethnically heterogeneous census places, such as
the U.S. West. Controlling for ‘race-specific’ variables in place of an overall diversity index may
yield more insight into how ‘racial groups’ voted. As more data becomes available, it will be
important for researchers to consider Latino immigration is framed in general, and its relation to
policy.
The data yielded interesting theoretical implications, as it coincides with existing data
showing the Latino Threat Narrative to be fictitious in discourse, but existential in implication.
Many policy makers and native-born U.S. residents must reconcile with the fact that immigrant
communities are not as dangerous as the rhetoric suggests. Instead, diversity is linked to lower,
not higher, rates of crime that enhances the protective effects of immigration more broadly.
The results of this paper contributes theoretically to the discourse surrounding Latino
immigration, crime, and voting, and, simultaneously leads to deeper and more pressing
questions. If the mere presence of a Latino immigrants affects conservative voting and policy at
the macro-level, what does this mean for this already marginalized population, both presently
and in the future?
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the independent variable and all dependent variables
(n=2595).
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

per_gop

.63025

.153604

2959

% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born

47.5781

26.98967

2959

1347.8196

996.31790

2959

Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian

.37604

.204543

2959

% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school degree

14.5081

6.50050

2959

% of total population 16+ unemployed

4.5116

1.74726

2959

Index violence rate per 100,000
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Table 2: Bivariate Correlations for the independent variable, per_gop, and all dependent variables (n=2959).
per_gop

% of FB pop that

Index violence

Diversity -

% of total pop.

% of total

are Lat Am

rate per 100,000

standardized - W,

25+ w/o high

population 16+

B, H, Asian

school degree

unemployed

foreign born
Pearson

per_gop

1.000

.134

-.205

-.473

.127

-.341

Correlation

% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign

.134

1.00

.061

.416

.478

.042

Index violence rate per 100,000

-.205

.061

1.000

.338

.131

.290

Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian

-.473

.416

.338

1.000

.323

.348

.127

.478

31

.323

1.000

.316

-.341

.042

.290

.348

.316

1.000

.

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

.000

.012

Index violence rate per 100,000

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

.000

Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian

.000

.000

.000

.

.000

.000

% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school

.000

.000

.000

.000

.

.000

% of total population 16+ unemployed

.000

.012

.000

.000

.000

.

per_gop

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

Index violence rate per 100,000

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

Diversity - standardized - W, B, H, Asian

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

2959

born

% of total pop. 25+ w/o high school
degree
% of total population 16+ unemployed
Sig. (1-tailed)

per_gop
% of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign
born

degree
N

born

degree
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% of total population 16+ unemployed

Table 3: Model Summary containing variance explained by each model and overall model
significance (n=2959).
Model

R

R Square

Adjusted R

Std. Error of

Square

the Estimate

Change Statistics
R Square

F Change

df1

df2

Sig. F Change

Change
1

.252a

.064

.063

.148686

.064

100.451

2

2956

.000

2

.597b

.357

.356

.123270

.293

1345.602

1

2955

.000

3

.652c

.426

.425

.116518

.069

177.211

2

2953

.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born
b. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born, Diversity - standardized W, B, H, Asian
c. Predictors: (Constant), Index violence rate per 100,000, % of FB pop that are Lat Am foreign born, Diversity - standardized W, B, H, Asian, % of total population 16+ unemployed, % of total pop. 25+ w/o high school degree
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Table 4: Coefficients for Models 1, 2,and 3 predicting 2016 county-level GOP votes, net other key predictors (n=2959)
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

1

Std. Error

(Constant)

.635

.007

% of FB pop that are

.001

.000

-3.302E-

.000

t

Sig.

95.0% Confidence Interval

Correlations

Collinearity

for B

Beta

Statistics

Lower

Upper

Zero-

Bound

Bound

order

Partial

Part

Tolerance

VIF

97.587

.000

.622

.648

.147

8.237

.000

.001

.001

.134

.150

.147

.996

1.004

-.214

-12.013

.000

.000

.000

-.205

-.216

-.214

.996

1.004

123.212

.000

.693

.716

Lat Am foreign born
Index violence rate per
100,000
2

5

(Constant)

.705

.006

% of FB pop that are

.002

.000

.398

24.450

.000

.002

.002

.134

.410

.361

.820

1.220

-2.313E-

.000

-.015

-.953

.341

.000

.000

-.205

-.018

-.014

.878

1.139

-.476

.013

-.634

-36.682

.000

-.502

-.451

-.473

-.559

-.541

.729

1.372

(Constant)

.726

.007

100.638

.000

.711

.740

% of FB pop that are

.001

.000

.262

15.160

.000

.001

.002

.134

.269

.211

.652

1.533

1.776E-6

.000

.012

.760

.447

.000

.000

-.205

.014

.011

.847

1.180

-.443

.013

-.590

-34.510

.000

-.469

-.418

-.473

-.536

-.481

.665

1.504

.006

.000

.265

15.685

.000

.005

.007

.127

.277

.219

.682

1.466

-.021

.001

-.234

-14.622

.000

-.023

-.018

-.341

-.260

-.204

.761

1.314

Lat Am foreign born
Index violence rate per
100,000
Diversity - standardized

6

- W, B, H, Asian
3

Lat Am foreign born
Index violence rate per
100,000
Diversity - standardized
- W, B, H, Asian
% of total pop. 25+ w/o
high school degree
% of total population

25

16+ unemployed

a. Dependent Variable: per_gop
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